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AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
TRIAL LAWYERS REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION
ON DISRUPTION OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS'
PREAMBLE

T

of the American College of Trial Lawyers are deeply
concerned by the tactics of trial disruption which on occasion have
converted trials into spectacles of disorder and even violence.
HE MEMBERS

These tactics, involving contemptuous and obscene language and
other techniques deliberately designed to break the judge and frustrate
the judicial process, have been employed by defendants and tolerated
and encouraged by some of their counsel. Indeed, some counsel appear
to have been active participants in the disruption.
Prosecutors also from time to time have been guilty of courtroom
misconduct.
In some instances judges have overreacted to these tactics.
The cure for such aberrations lies within the judicial system itself.
The courts of this country have sustained and enforced the Constitution

t This article is a reprint of the report issued by the Committee on Disruption of
the Judicial Process of the American College of Trial Lawyers. Members of the
committee included Messrs. Hicks Epton, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., C. Brewster Rhoads,
Simon H. Rifkind, Whitney North Seymour, Edward Bennett Williams, and Delmar Karlen. Following the Preamble, those principles which are recommended to
be applied to avert threatened disruption of the judicial process are printed in bold
face type, followed in each case by a brief commentary. Minor adaptations have
been made to conform the Report to the uniform system of citation.
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and the Bill of Rights, and their recordespecially in times of stress and turmoilis proof that the rule of law affords the best
hope for the protection and extension of
individual rights.
These rights-which include the most
basic constitutional rights of all citizenswill be endangered if the judicial process
of this country is not safeguarded against
those who would defile and destroy it.
The foregoing considerations led to the
creation and appointment of a committee
to study and report on measures which
should be taken to guard against such disruptions in the future. The Supreme Court's
recent decision in the Illinois v. Allen' case
is a substantial step in this direction. But
there remain problems involving the duties
of lawyers and judges which need to be
dealt with. The Committee's recommendations, appended hereto, have been approved
by the Regents of the American College of
Trial Lawyers.
It is appropriate that these recommendations be made known now. Although disruptive tactics have occurred occasionally
in the past, they now threaten to become
systematized and popularized among small
but militant segments of the profession and
the general public. Recently lawyers responsible for courtroom disruption have
been warmly welcomed by university students-even law students-as if, somehow,
their conduct was responsible and heroic.
Little thought seems to have been given to
the fact that aside from the violation of
traditional standards of professional duty,

1 397 U.S. 337 (1970).

such conduct prejudices the interests of the
clients, however much they may encourage
and participate in it. Furthermore, it prejudices others who may be tried in the future,
because members of the public are revolted
by this degradation of the courts and the
precious right of fair trial.
Those who can take a long, reflective
view of the ultimate consequences of such
activities must be aware that such courtroom tactics not only demean the judicial
process, but also are extremely prejudicial
to the rights of minorities and of unpopular
persons and causes generally.
I
EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL
Courts exist to administer equal justice
to the rich and the poor, the good and the
bad, the strong and the weak, the native
born and the foreign born of every race,
color, nationality and religion, to men and
women of every shade of political belief,
to those who enjoy popular favor and to
those who are popularly despised, feared or
hated.
All persons who come before the courts
are entitled to vigorous and zealous representation within the law by qualified counsel-representation which is sanctioned,
encouraged and protected by the judiciary
and the organized bar.
COMMENTARY

The first paragraph is a paraphrase and
expansion of a statement in the majority
opinion in Illinois v. Allen. 2 The expansion

2/Id.
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is predicated on cases too numerous
mention which spell out the concepts
due process and equal protection under
fifth and fourteenth amendments to
United States Constitution.

to
of
the
the

The second paragraph is a reaffirmation
of the legal right and moral duty of lawyers
to represent unpopular, oppressed, poor or
otherwise handicapped clients with the
same zeal and vigor that they represent
those who are more fortunate. That right
and duty is strongly supported by the judi3
ciary and the organized bar.
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not empty formalities. They are essential to
an atmosphere in which justice can be done.
The right to a fair trial is the most basic
of all constitutional guarantees, underlying
and conditioning all other legal rights, constitutional or otherwise.
COMMENTARY

The proposed A.B.A. Standards for
Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution
and Defense Functions make these observations:

See A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility,

Human experience with deliberative and
judicial processes demonstrates that certain rules or standards of conduct are
needed to ensure that, notwithstanding
differences in their objectives, contending
advocates will work in harmony for what
is their common cause, the administration
of justice. They must not allow themselves to be diverted by irrelevant, extraneous or disrupting factors. Basic to
an efficient and fair functioning of our
adversary system of justice is that at all
times there be an atmosphere manifesting mutual respect by all participants. This
can be achieved only by strict adherence
to firm standards of what may be called,
for want of better terms, professional
etiquette and deportment. There is no place
and no occasion for rudeness or overbearing, oppressive conduct. The control
of courtroom decorum lies in the advocates'
acceptance of standards of elementary
courtesy and politeness in human, relations,
but ultimately the presiding judge has the
responsibility to govern the conduct of all
persons in the courtroom, and especially
the conduct of the advocates who, as officers of the court, are subject to the court's
control.

EC 2-27; Code of Trial Conduct of the American
College of Trial Lawyers, Rule 3; Proposed
A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice Relating
to the Defense Function, Standard 1.5.

The objective of such standards is to
keep the understandably contentious spirit
of the opposing advocates within appro-

II

COURTROOM ATMOSPHERE AND
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL,
In administering justice, courts are required to perform two difficult tasks: discovering where the truth lies between conflicting versions of the facts, and applying
to the facts so found the relevant legal principles. These tasks are as demanding and
delicate as a surgical operation, and, like
such an operation, they cannot be performed in an atmosphere of bedlam.
Unless order is maintained in the courtroom and disruption prevented, reason cannot prevail and constitutional rights to liberty, freedom and equality under law cannot be protected. The dignity, decorum and
courtesy which have traditionally characterized the courts of civilized nations are

3
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priate bounds and constructive channels
so that the issues may be resolved on the
merits and the proceedings not be diverted
by the intrusion of factors such as personality or acrimonious exchanges between
the advocates or between advocates and
the witnesses, or play-acting in an effort
to sway jurors by other than legitimate
evidence. 'Baiting' of witnesses of the other
side, or of the trial judge, blurs and confuses the very issues which the trial is
intended to sharpen and clarify. Lawyers
must expect that every intrusion of bad
manners or other rudeness into a trial will
be dealt with swiftly and sternly by the
presiding judge. Necessarily, the 'ground
rules' of professional conduct must be
known by counsel and violations of the
rules made the subject of disciplinary
action by the courts and bar associations.
The same considerations which call for
certain standards of conduct for advocates
require that the judge should at all times
maintain a scrupulously neutral and fair
attitude; deviations from standards of appropriate judicial conduct should be made
part of the record so as to be brought to
4
the attention of reviewing courts.
The relative importance of the right to
a fair and orderly trial as compared to other
legal rights has long been recognized. It was
well stated by Lord Justice Salmon in a recent English case involving the disruption
of a London courtroom by Welsh university students singing Welsh songs, shouting
slogans and distributing pamphlets. He
said:
Every member of the public has an inalienable right that our courts shall be
left free to administer justice without ob-

4 Commentary to Standard 7.1, at 257-58.

struction or interference from whatever
quarter it may come. Take away that right
and freedom of speech together with all
other freedoms would wither and die, for
in the long run it is the courts of justice
which are the last bastion of individual
l iberty.5

Ill
THE LAWYER'S OBLIGATIONS
A lawyer has these professional obligations:
(a) to represent every client courageously, vigorously, diligently and
with all the skill and knowledge he
possesses;
(b) to do so according to law and the
standards of professional conduct as
defined in codes and canons of the
legal profession;
(c) to conduct himself in such a way as
to avoid disorder or disruption in
the courtroom;
(d) to advise any client appearing in a
courtroom of the kind of behavior
expected and required of him there,
and to prevent him, so far as lies
within the lawyer's power, from creating disorder or disruption in the
courtroom.
A lawyer is not relieved of these obligations by any shortcomings on the part of
the judge, nor is he relieved of them by the
legal, moral, political, social or ideological
merits of the cause of any client.

5 Morris v. Master of the Crown Office, [1970]
2 W.L.R. 792, 800-01 (C.A.).
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The prosecuting attorney and the defense
counsel have distinct although closely related functions and obligations. As the Introduction to the proposed A.B.A, Standard for Criminal Justice Relating to the
Defense Function states:
There is no responsible challenge to the
view that the basic ethics of defense and
prosecution advocates are the same, even
though the roles and functions of the two
differ, and that each must perform his role
as a professional advocate within the rules
of law and standards of professional ethics.
Defense counsel and prosecution alike have
duties higher than "winning the case....6

Defense Counsel
The commentary in support of Standard
1.1(b) of the proposed A.B.A. Standards
for Criminal Justice Relating to the Defense
Function is a restatement of long standing
traditions of the Anglo-American legal profession. It states:
Advocacy is not for the timid, the meek
or the retiring. Our system of justice is
inherently contentious in nature, albeit
bounded by the rules of professional ethics
and decorum, and it demands that the
lawyer have the urge for vigorous contest.
Nor can a lawyer be halfhearted in the
application of his energies to a case. Once
he has undertaken the case, he is obliged
not to omit any essential honorable step
in the defense, without regard to his compensation or the nature of his appointment.
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English Guide to Conduct and Etiquette
at the Bar in this language:
According to the best traditions of the
Bar, a barrister should, while acting with
all due courtesy to the tribunal before
which he is appearing, fearlessly uphold
the interests of his client without regard
to any unpleasant consequences either to
himself or to any other person.
There are limits to what lawyers may do
in representing their clients which have long
been recognized and respected by virtually
8
all members of the legal profession.
The proper role of a defense lawyer is
stated in the proposed A.B.A. Standards for
Criminal Justice Relating to the Defense
Function as follows:
From time to time over the past one hundred years or more, in both England and
America, an occasional voice is raised advocating what has come to be known as
the 'alter ego' theory of advocacy. The
thesis depicts defense counsel as an agent
permitted, and perhaps even obliged, to
do for the accused everything he would
do for himself if only he possessed the
necessary skills and training in the law;
in short, that the lawyer is always to execute the directives of the client. This spuriious view has been totally and unequivocally
rejected for over one hundred years under
canons governing English barristers and is
similarly rejected by canons of the American Bar Association and other reputable
professional organizations. (Italics sup-

7

The same thought is expressed in the

6 Proposed A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice
Relating to the Defense Function, at 145.
7 Id. at 174.

s See A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility,

DR 7-102(A) (7) & (8), EC 7-5, 7-10, 7-17, 7-19,
7-22; Code of Trial Conduct of American College
of Trial Lawyers, Preamble, Rules 16 & 18; Proposed A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Defense Function, 1.1(c) & (e),
1.2(c), 1.3, 3.7(6), 7.1(c) & (d), 7.5(b).
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plied) It would be difficult to imagine anything which would more gravely demean
the advocate or undermine the integrity
of our system of justice than the idea that
a defense lawyer should be simply a conduit for his client's desires. As intermediary, counsel expresses to the court
objectively, in measured words and forceful tone, what a particular defendant may
be incapable of expressing himself simply
because he lacks the education and train-

The Prosecuting Attorney

ing. ...

to seek justice, not merely to convict. .

As in other contexts of human endeavor, the intermediary brings to the controversy an emotional detachment which
permits him to make a more dispassionate
appraisal. He translates the desired course
of action into those steps which the form
and procedure of the system permit and
professional judgment dictates. He channels the controversy into the established
mode of legal procedure and deals with
the other participants in the process-the
prosecutor, the judge-on the level of professional understanding of the rules and
their respective roles. When the lawyer
loses that detachment by too closely identifying with his client, a large measure of the
lawyer's value is lost; indeed he then suffers
some of the same disabilities as an accused
acting as his own counsel.U
The proposed Standards also make it
clear that the lawyer, not his client, is master of trial strategy and tactics:
The decisions on what witnesses to call,
whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike,
what trial motions should be made, and
all other strategic and tactical decisions
are the exclusive province of the lawyer
after consultation with his client.' 0

9 Proposed A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice
Relating to the Defense Function, at 146-47.
10 Id. Standard 5.2(b).

Prosecuting attorneys are held to courtroom standards at least as high, perhaps
higher, than those which govern defense
counsel. The role of the prosecutor is succinctly summarized in the Code of Professional Responsibility as follows: "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs
from that of the usual advocate; his duty is
..

"I'

Expanding on this theme, a commentary
to the proposed A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution
Function states:
Although the prosecutor operates within
the adversary system, it is fundamental
that his obligation is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to
guard the rights of the accused as well as
to enforce the rights of the public. ABA
Code EC 7-13. One of the great traditions
of the profession is exemplified in the conduct of the late Homer Cummings while
a Connecticut prosecutor. Upon discovery
of facts which cast grave doubt on the
guilt of the accused, he brought all the
details to the attention of the jury. The
resulting acquittal of an innocent accused
12
vindicated the processes of justice.
and further:
The legal profession must develop a
new and acute awareness of the importance
of a vigorous, fair and efficient prosecution
system and give a high priority to sponsorship and support of those measures necessary to implement this objective. For his

11 A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility,
EC 7-13.
32 Proposed A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Jus-

tice Relating to the Prosecution Function, at 44.

16
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part, it is the duty of the prosecutor to
become intimately familiar with and adhere
to the legal and ethical standards governing
the performance of his official duties. Like
other lawyers, he is subject to disciplinary
sanctions for conduct prohibited by applicable codes and canons .... 13

(b) to recognize the obligation of every
lawyer to represent his clients courageously and vigorously, and to treat
every lawyer with the courtesy and
respect due one performing an essential role in the trial process;

The proposed Standards 5.2 (a), (b) and
(c) spell out the restrictions on the courtroom conduct of the prosecutor in these

(c) to avoid becoming personally involved in any case before him, to
preside firmly and impartially, and
to conduct himself and the trial in
such a way as to prevent, if possible,
disorder or disruption in the courtroom.

terms:
The prosecutor should support the
authority of the court and the dignity of
the trial courtroom by strict adherence to
the rules of decorum and by manifesting
an attitude of professional respect toward
the judge, opposing counsel, witnesses, defendants, jurors and others in the courtroom.
When court is in session the prosecutor
should address the court, not opposing
counsel, on all matters relating to the case.
It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to engage in behavior or tactics
purposefully calculated to irritate or annoy
the court or opposing counsel.

He is not relieved of these obligations by
any shortcomings on the part of any lawyer,
or by the legal, moral, political, social or
ideological deficiencies of the cause of any
litigant.
COMMENTARY

That a judge has reciprocal obligations,
paralleling and complementing those of the
lawyers is beyond question. Rule 18(a) of
the Code of Trial Conduct of the American
College of Trial Lawyers states:

IV
THE JUDGE'S OBLIGATIONS
A judge has these professional obligations:
(a) to consider objectively any challenge
of his right to preside; to deny it
courageously if the challenge is unfounded; to allow it if it is well
founded; and to disqualify himself
without challenge if he is biased or
plausibly may be suspected of bias;

13

Id. at 45.

During the trial, a lawyer should always
display a courteous, dignified and respectful attitude toward the judge presiding,
not for the sake of his person, but for the
maintenance of respect for and confidence
in the judicial office. The judge, to render
effective such conduct, has reciprocal responsibilities of courtesy to and respect
for the lawyer, who is also an officer of
the court. . ..
Similarly, Canon 10 of the A.B.A. Canons
of Judicial Ethics provides:
A judge should be courteous to counsel,
especially to those who are young and inexperienced, and also to all others appear-
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ing or concerned in the administration of
justice in the court.

He should also require, and, so far as
his power extends, enforce on the part of
clerks, court officers and counsel civility
and courtesy to the court and to jurors,
witnesses, litigants and others having business in the court.
And Canon 15 further provides:

Conversation between the judge and
counsel in court is often necessary, but
the judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the
merits of the dispute between litigants and
lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing
counsel, litigants, or witnesses, he should
avoid a controversial manner or tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel
in their arguments except to clarify his
mind as to their positions, and he should
not be tempted to the unnecessary display
of learning or a premature judgment.

V
CONTEMPT POWER
The power of a judge to punish contempt
committed in his presence is not designed
to protect his own dignity or person, but to
protect the rights of litigants and the public
by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be thwarted or obstructed.
A trial judge has power to punish summarily for contempt any lawyer who in his
presence willfully contributes to disorder or
disruption in the courtroom. The judge may
exercise this power without a jury, without
making a new record and without referring
the matter to another judge. He may do so
at any stage of the proceedings without
waiting for their conclusion, and he may do

so as many times as appears necessary to
ensure fair and orderly proceedings.
COMMENTARY

In the recent English case mentioned
earlier, Mr. Justice Salmon said:
The archaic description of these proceedings as "contempt of court" is in my view
unfortunate and misleading. It suggests that
they are designed to buttress the dignity
of the judges and to protect them from insult. Nothing could be further from the
truth. No such protection is needed. The
sole purpose of proceedings for contempt
is to give our courts the power effectively
to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice
shall not be obstructed or prevented .... 14
This puts the contempt power into proper
perspective.
Some persons are troubled by the thought
of a judge acting not only in that capacity
but also as accuser and prosecutor in dealing with contempts committed in his presence. They think he may be too much involved personally to be able to act fairly.
They would prefer to see a courtroom contempt handled in a later, separate proceeding before another judge, and possibly a
jury as well. Failing that, they would prefer the judge in whose presence the contempt was committed to defer action until
the main trial was concluded.
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons
and ample precedents for allowing and encouraging a judge to act directly and immediately. He has the responsibility to keep

14 Morris v. Master of the Crown Office, [1970]

2 W.L.R. 792, 801 (C.A.).

16
a case moving and not allow it to terminate
prematurely. He has the further responsibility to keep it under control at all times,
not allowing it to degenerate into a brawl.
A rational inquiry into the facts of a contested case and the application of legal principles to the facts found cannot be carried
on in an atmosphere of wild disorder. If a
judge allows contempts to accumulate while
he strives vainly to maintain order in the
courtroom and to move the case forward,
he is not discharging his full responsibility
to the public or the litigants to ensure a
fair and expeditious trial.
A separate, later trial for contempt, even
before the same judge, is not an effective
way to control a situation when control is
needed, but merely an inquiry into whether
punishment for past wrongs is merited. It
may also raise unnecessary legal problems
as to accumulating punishments beyond the
limits permitted by summary procedure for
a series of contemptuous acts. Finally, it
deprives the judge of the ability to increase
gradually the pressure on a lawyer to behave himself in court, starting with a warning, then a suspended sentence, then a light
but unsuspended sentence, then a heavier
and unsuspended sentence.
If a separate, later contempt proceeding
is conducted by another judge, it can be
extremely wasteful and dilatory. There is
no need for a second judicial investigation
of what one judge has already witnessed
directly. Months may elapse before the
contempt trial begins. Then more months
may elapse while virtually the whole first
trial is reenacted. Not only what was said
in the courtroom, but how it was saidthe tone of voice, the gestures, the facial
expressions of all who participated-may
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come into question. Hence it may be impossible to restrict the proceeding to an examination of the trial record alone. Furthermore, if the original trial was disrupted, it
is by no means inconceivable that a second
trial may be disrupted in much the same
way. If the first trial took two or three
months, it is unrealistic to expect that the
contempt proceedings can be concluded in
less time.
Impartial, disinterested protection against
the abuse of judicial power can and should
be provided by appellate review, not by an
automatic new trial before another judge
(who in all probability would be a colleague
of the judge in whose courtroom the disruption took place). An appellate court has
power not only to decide whether any contempt was committed, but also whether the
sentence imposed was within the bounds of
judicial discretion.1t It also has power in an
appropriate case to remand the proceeding
for trial before a different judge. 16
The suggestion has been made that whenever trial disruption is anticipated, another
judge should be brought into the courtroom
with the sole duty of either observing or
handling contempt proceedings. This is a
novel idea, calling for a great departure
from existing practice and creating substantial difficulties in judicial administration.

15 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41,

52, reh'g denied, 359 U.S. 976 (1959); Green v.
United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958); State v.
Alexander, 257 A.2d 778, 781-83 (Me. 1969);
Neering v. State, 155 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1963);
People v. DeStefano, 64 111.App. 2d 172, 174,
183, 212 N.E.2d 368, 370, 379 (1965).
16 See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14-15
(1954); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,
539-40 (1925).
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It might be worth pursuing if there were no
other fair and expeditious way of controlling courtroom disruption. But there is
such a way: the traditional way, involving
summary procedure by the judge in whose
presence the contempt was committed, followed by prompt and impartial review. It
has been used for centuries and sanctioned
by the highest authority.'"
VI
SANCTIONS
In lieu of imposing a traditional fine or
imprisonment (for not more than six
months), a judge, if permitted by law, may
impose any of the following lesser sanctions, which are necessarily implicit in the
power to impose imprisonment:
(a) Termination of the lawyer's right to
continue as counsel in the case in
which the contempt was committed;
(b) Suspension for 6 months or less of
his right to appear in any case in the
particular court where the contempt
was committed; or
(c) Suspension for 6 months or less of
his right to appear in any court of
the jurisdiction where the contempt
was committed.
The judge may stay the execution of any
contempt sentence pending appeal.

17 See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1
(1952); United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91
(6th Cir. 1965); Morris v. Master of the Crown
Office, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 792 (C.A.).

COMMENTARY

If a judge has inherent power to remove
a disruptive defendant from the courtroom,' 8 he should have inherent power to
deal with a disruptive lawyer in much the
same way-by excluding him from further
participation in the case. That, in any event,
would be the consequence of sending him
to jail-a sanction clearly within the power
of the judge. The greater sanction of imprisonment necessarily includes the lesser
sanction of a restriction upon his right to
practice law.
Sending a lawyer to jail would not only
prevent his participation in the particular
case where the contempt was committed;
it would prevent him from appearing in any
case in any court while the sentence was in
effect. Logically, therefore, a judge should
be able to suspend a lawyer's right to appear in any court in the nation, state or
federal, for as long a period as he could
imprison the lawyer (not more than 6
months without a jury trial, according to
Bloom v. Illinois).'"
Nevertheless, the foregoing principle does
not go that far, because such a recommendation would raise too many difficult problems of comity and reciprocity between
jurisdictions. Instead the recommendation
is that the judge have authority to suspend
the lawyer's right to appear only in the
particular court where the contempt was
committed, or only in any court of the
jurisdiction (the state or the Federal District) where the contempt was committed.
Thus a lawyer indulging in disruptive be-

18 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
19 391 U.S. 194 (1968).

16
havior in the Superior Court of California
for Los Angeles County could be suspended
from appearing only in that court, while
remaining free to appear in the Municipal
Court there or the Federal District Court
there or in any other California court or in
any other state or federal court; or he could
be suspended from appearing in any California state court while remaining free to
appear in the court of any other state or in
any federal court, including one in California. In short, the judge's power in contempt proceedings to restrict a lawyer's
right to practice law is carefully limited in
the foregoing principle.
Even so limited, the idea of giving a
judge power to limit a lawyer's right to
practice may seem to some a wide departure from existing practice. It is less so than
it seems. Some aspects of bar discipline,
although traditionally entrusted in the first
instance to bar associations or committees,
are subject to ultimate control by the courts
through a review of disciplinary proceedings. Other aspects of bar discipline are accomplished through contempt proceedings
handled directly by the courts at both trial
and appellate levels. Since the right to practice is ultimately subject to court control
there is no valid reason why such control
cannot be exercised in a limited area of
professional misconduct more directly than
has been traditional in the past.
Shortly before he became Chief Justice
of the United States, the Honorable Warren
E. Burger made this observation in a case
involving courtroom misconduct by a
lawyer:
all members of the bar are on notice that
disciplinary mechanisms are available to
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the trial court to deal with unlawyerlike
behavior. Lawyers who fail to learn or
remember the rules of courtroom conduct
may need the forcible reminders which will
tend to upgrade the courtroom perform20
ance of lawyers generally.
Suspension of the right to appear in court
is not disbarment. It would not prohibit
other types of law practice, nor would it be
permanent. Disbarment would continue to
be the function of traditional disciplinary
proceedings in appropriate situations. While
they were getting under way, however, suspension of the right to appear in court
would prevent an evil from continuing or
spreading.
In many, perhaps most, circumstances,
restricting a lawyer's right to appear in
court is a better method of handling disruptive conduct than imprisonment for several
reasons. First, it is less drastic. Second, it is
more responsive to the type of conduct involved. Third, it makes possible greater
gradations of punishment than now exist
to fit the offender and his offense.
Unfortunately, in some jurisdictions
there are legislative restrictions on the
punishments which may be imposed
for contempt, limiting them to the traditional penalties of fines and imprisonment,
and leaving any restrictions upon a lawyer's
right to practice law to traditional disciplinary proceedings. 21 Where necessary, statutes should be changed to authorize the
sanctions for contempt recommended above.

20 Harris v. United States, 402 F.2d 656, 659

(D.C. Cir. 1968) .
21 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964); EY parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873); Phelan v. Guam,
394 F.2d 293, 296-97 (9th Cir. 1968).
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Bar discipline is a matter peculiarly within
the province of the judicial branch of government. Indeed, the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Evaluation
of Disciplinary Enforcement, headed by retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark,
goes so far as to say, after reviewing the
authorities:

become physically incapable of presiding.
In such circumstances a retrial is possible
without danger of a successful claim of
double jeopardy.': If a mistrial were to be
granted when there was no necessity to terminate the proceedings, or if it were deliberately caused by the prosecution, a claim
24
of double jeopardy would have merit.

This Committee strongly urges courts
having disciplinary jurisdiction to exercise
their inherent power to strike down any
attempt by the legislature to interfere with
their exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline of attorneys. There are ample pre22
cedents to support this position.

VII
CONTINUANCE OR MISTRIAL
In the event any contempt sentence prevents a lawyer from continuing to represent
his clients in the case, the judge may grant
such continuance as may be necessary to
secure new counsel, or, if that is not practicable, may declare a mistrial.
COMMENTARY

If disruption reaches the point where it is
impossible to carry on the proceeding without removing counsel, and if no other counsel is available to carry on after a reason-

VIII
WARNING
In any case where there is reason to anticipate disorder or disruption, the judge
should make known in open court the type
of behavior required in his courtroom and
the nature and extent of his contempt powers. He should do so at the outset of the
proceeding if possible, and should repeat
the warning as often as he deems necessary.
COMMENTARY

Judges ordinarily give ample advance
warning to those likely to be cited for contempt arising out of courtroom disorders.
Indeed, they are probably required to do so
in order to satisfy the requirements of due
process.25 The warnings should be early
and frequent whenever there is reason to
anticipate disruption or disorder.

able continuance, the only solution which
is fair to the litigants is to declare a mistrial. Such an occurrence should be regarded as a breakdown of the judicial machinery, just as if the judge had died or

A.B.A. Special Committe on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, Final Draft, June
1970, at 13 [hereinafter Clark Report].
22

23 See Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, reh'g

denied, 368 U.S. 870 (1961); see also United
States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d
552, 557-58 (3rd Cir. 1969).
24 United States v. Whitlow, 110 F. Supp. 871
(D.D.C. 1953); McCabe v. Bronx County Court,
24 Misc. 2d 477, 199 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1960).
25 See Illinois v. Alien, 397 U.S. 337, 347-51
(1970) (Brennan, J.,concurring).
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Ix
APPELLATE REVIEW
The rules of appellate procedure should
provide that an appeal from any contempt
sentence imposed on a lawyer for courtroom disorder or disruption shall receive a
preference over all other pending appeals;
that the reviewing court may dispense with
written briefs at its discretion, may specify
the record it requires, and may order the
trial court and the court reporter to expedite its preparation; that it shall possess
all powers it has in other cases, including
the power to consider the judge's conduct
of the case in relation to the lawyer's behavior, to modify any sentence imposed,
to suspend its execution pending final determination of the appeal and to remand
the proceeding for a new trial of the contempt on some or all issues before the original or another judge.
COMMENTARY

Just as a trial judge should deal promptly
with disruptive tactics, so also should an
appellate court in reviewing any contempt
sentence imposed by him. Delay is unfair
to the lawyer who has been sentenced and
detrimental to the administration of fair
and orderly justice. If uncertainty is allowed
to persist in the minds of lawyers and the
general public as to what conduct is permissible in a courtroom, the evil aimed at
may spread like a cancer until it gets out of
control and public confidence in the courts
is lost.
Appellate courts act speedily in election
cases and others where necessity dictates.
They should regard contempt proceedings
growing out of disruptive tactics as being in
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the same category, justifying a position of
priority over other pending appeals. In the
English case mentioned earlier, where
Welsh students disrupted a trial, the contempt occurred and the sentences were imposed on February 4, 1970. The appeal was
decided on February 11, 1970, exactly one
week later. There is no legitimate reason
why American courts cannot do as well.
Appellate courts are charged with supervisory powers over the courts below them.
They have an interest in seeing that those
courts act properly. Not being personally
involved in the contempt proceedings under
review, they provide disinterested protection against possible abuses of judicial
office.

2

6

X
ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE
A judge to whom an application is made
on behalf of a lawyer not licensed to practice in his court for permission to appear
in a particular case may deny such application if it is established that the lawyer has
willfully engaged in disorderly or disruptive
tactics in any other court. He may grant
permission conditioned on proper behavior,
and in any event:
(a) shall advise the lawyer of the kind
of behavior expected of him;
(b) may require him to promise proper
conduct;
(c) may require him to disclose all courts

26 See also commentary to principle V (contempt

power) supra.

DISRUPTION OF THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS

in which he is authorized to practice;
and
(d) may require local counsel to be appointed as well, with responsibility
to be prepared to step in and assume
control of the client's case if primary
counsel is removed.
COMMENTARY

Permission for a lawyer not admitted to
practice before a particular court to appear
in a single case should not be granted indiscriminately. If the court has good reason
to believe that the lawyer, based on his past
performance, is likely to engage in trial disruption, permission may be denied. If the
issue is doubtful, the court should condition
its permission on assurances of proper behavior, and in addition insist upon the appointment of local counsel to take over
control of the case if it should become
necessary to remove the primary counsel.
A court is likely to be able to maintain more
effective discipline over a member of the
local bar than over a lawyer based in another state.
XI
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Court rules should provide that the trial
judge and the appellate court, respectively,
shall without delay certify the record and
result of any contempt proceeding for
courtroom disorder or disruption involving
any lawyer to the body having authority to
disbar, suspend or impose other disciplinary
sanctions on him in any state where he has
been admitted to the bar.
Disciplinary proceedings involving dis-

ruptive tactics should receive a preference
over all other disciplinary proceedings, and
should be commenced and concluded as expeditiously as possible.
Rules of appellate procedure should provide that if any appellate court reviewing
a contempt sentence imposed on a lawyer
for disruptive conduct believes that the trial
judge was himself guilty of serious courtroom misconduct beyond the appellate
court's own power to correct, it shall certify
that fact, along with its own opinion and the
trial record, to any official body having authority to impose disciplinary sanctions
against the judge or to express censure or
admonition with respect to his conduct.
Disciplinary proceedings against judges
for courtroom misconduct should receive a
preference over all other disciplinary proceedings against judges, and should be commenced and concluded as expeditiously as
possible.
COMMENTARY

The same reasons which justify priority
in appellate review for contempt proceedings arising out of courtroom disruptions
also justify priority in disciplinary proceedings arising from them. Too often disciplinary proceedings are slow in getting started
and slow in being terminated. Prompt judicial reports of courtroom misconduct will
27
expedite the initiation of proceedings.
Ghing them priority for hearing will hasten
their termination.
In addition, attention should be given to

27 Reports as to misconduct by lawyers are now
required by Canon I I of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

16
strengthening the procedures for enforcing
judicial and professional discipline. A major
overhaul of the machinery of enforcement
of bar discipline is long overdue, along the
general lines recommended and documented in the Clark Report. Furthermore,
in some judicial systems (including the federal), the only procedure for enforcing
judicial discipline is the seldom-used, slow,
costly, cumbersome and generally ineffective method of impeachment. Consideration should be given to supplementing that
method through the creation, by constitutional amendment if necessary, of a body
similar to California's Commission on Judicial Qualifications.-"8
XII
LITIGANTS AND SPECTATORSOTHER TYPES OF CONTEMPT
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do not involve courtroom disruption or
disorder.
COMMENTARY

This emphasizes the narrow scope of the
foregoing principles. They deal only with
courtroom disruption involving lawyers and
judges, not with courtroom disruption by
litigants or spectators acting independently,
and not with out-of-court contempts,
whether committed by lawyers or others.
Such contempts, not being entirely novel,
do not pose the same, new, direct, jugular
threat to the judicial process that is posed
by disruptive tactics practiced by lawyers
in the courtroom. They can be handled,
more or less adequately, by traditional contempt and disciplinary procedures. If traditional methods need strengthening, that
should be the subject of separate consideration.

Nothing in the foregoing is intended to
curtail a judge's power and duty to deal
with disorderly litigants in one of the manners specified in Illinois v. Allen; or with
disorderly spectators by traditional contempt powers; or with other contempts (including those committed by lawyers) which

Neither do the principles deal with substantive and procedural rules which may
contribute to courtroom disruption, such
as the use of conspiracy charges and the
practice of trying numerous defendants
jointly. Such problems again require separate consideration.

art. 6, §§ 8 & 18; Cal. Rules of

The principles, although aimed primarily
at criminal cases, are also applicable to
civil cases.

28 CAL. CONST.

Court 909-19.

